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Azerbaijan – a growing problem for the West
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West, launched two decades ago, has helped it become 
a relatively strong and ambitious actor on the international stage. It has become a key country 
in the region from the Western (USA and the EU) and Turkish points of view, as well as an impor-
tant partner in the energy sector. The strategic EU concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, also 
supported by the United States, is among the initiatives based on cooperation with Azerbaijan.
Surprisingly, however, Azerbaijan’s increased ambition and importance have caused its policy 
to diverge ever farther from the expectations and plans formulated by the West. The chan-
ges in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, occurring in the context of the conflict in 
Ukraine, have forced Azerbaijan to revise its assessment of its position in the region. The main 
impetus for Azerbaijan’s actions is fear of Russia, as well as the weakness of the West which 
has become particularly apparent in the recent stages of the Ukrainian crisis. 
Azerbaijan’s actions so far have displayed its tendency to deepen its self-isolation in foreign 
affairs and consolidate its authoritarian system. This comes as a challenge to the West, whose 
ability to shape its relations with Azerbaijan has weakened considerably. This state of affa-
irs poses the threat that in the current situation, the Southern Gas Corridor concept, which 
Azerbaijan amended in 2012 in its own favour, might become totally blocked.
Azerbaijan and the West:  
a strategic alliance 
From the point of view of both the West (USA 
and the EU) and Russia, Azerbaijan is a coun-
try of key importance in the South Caucasus. 
This is due to Azerbaijan’s deposits of natural 
resources (oil and gas), the largest population 
potential in the region, and the country’s stra-
tegic location at the intersection of the east- 
-west and north-south axes. This predestines 
Azerbaijan to play an important role in the shap-
ing of regional security, which was confirmed by 
Baku’s support to Georgia in its conflicts with 
Russia over gas issues in 2007 and 2008, among 
other decisions. Azerbaijan is also a potentially 
significant transit territory for natural resources 
from Central Asia – a project which the West 
is interested in and which Russia opposes. 
Despite the policy of equal distance towards the 
major international actors present in the region 
(Russia, USA, Iran), which has been officially de-
clared by the government of Azerbaijan since the 
1990s, in practice the state’s development and 
independence have been based on cooperation 
with USA, the EU and Turkey. The result of this 
decision (made by the previous president Hey-
dar Aliyev, who was in office from 1993 to 2003) 
was granting access to Western oil companies, 
especially the British BP, to Azeri oil deposits 
and the creation of energy routes originating in 
Azerbaijan and bypassing Russia. Furthermore, 
cooperation with the West was supposed to se-
cure Azerbaijan against Russia, which supports 
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Armenia. Baku lost Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
adjacent territories to Armenia as a result of the 
still unresolved conflict (the military phase of 
the conflict took place in 1991–1994). 
In the last two decades Azerbaijan has contin-
ued to develop its relations with the West to 
the detriment of its cooperation with Russia. 
This policy is illustrated by the following acts: 
directing the export of fuels to the West via the 
newly created routes, and thereby eliminating 
Russia as a recipient and intermediary in export 
projects; the significant position of the EU in 
Azerbaijan’s trade exchange1; and the inflow of 
Western investments2. The West has been per-
ceived as a source of incentives to modernisa-
tion in several sectors of the economy, and to 
some extent as a civilisational model –Azerbaija-
ni citizens study mainly in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Canada (ca. 50%) and Turkey 
(ca. 20%) as part of a government-funded for-
eign scholarship programme. Russia is the desti-
nation for only around 5% of Azerbaijanis ben-
efiting from government-funded scholarships3. 
1 The EU’s share of Azerbaijan’s exports is 48.3%, and 27.7% of 
its imports. Russia’s shares are 3.9% and 14.2% respectively, 
and Turkey’s 2.5% and 15.8%. Other important recipients of 
goods exported from Azerbaijan include: India (7.9%), Indo-
nesia (7.4%) and Israel (7%). Data for 2012: http://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113347.pdf
2 In 2013 the main investor countries operating in Azerbaijan 
were Turkey (39%), the United Kingdom (13%), the Nether-
lands and the UAE (both 11%). Russian investments accounted 
for 3% of the total number; data from http://www.azpromo.
az No official data is available concerning the accumulated 
foreign investments in Azerbaijan; most researchers assume 
that the country’s largest investor is the British company BP. 
3 Only one student out of 122 studied in Russia as part of the 
foreign scholarship programme funded by SOCAR. Azerbaijan 
does not sponsor scholarship programmes in the USA, fearing 
that this might strengthen domestic democratic movements. 
See http://xaricdetehsil.edu.gov.az/uploads/Statistika.pdf
However, Russia remains an important country 
in the context of economic migration; around 
1–1.5 million Azerbaijanis work in Russia. 
Cooperation with Azerbaijan enabled the West 
to gain access to fuel, launch the import of oil 
independent of Russia, and thereby strength-
en the newly-created post-Soviet states such as 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, while at the same time 
weakening Russia’s influences in the Caucasus. 
Contrary to the original assumptions, Azerbai-
jan has not become an important transit ter-
ritory for natural resources from Central Asia4. 
Nor have the goals connected with a systemic 
transformation modelled on Western standards 
been achieved; unlike the case of Georgia, the 
authorities in Baku have consistently built up 
the state’s authoritarian system. This system 
impedes any effective resolution of problems 
associated with political, social and religious is-
sues5, and focuses on stepping up the level of 
control over society.
Higher stake – bigger problems
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West has re-
sulted in the development of the oil sector and 
a sharp increase in the country’s income (the 
launch in 2006 of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil 
pipeline connecting Azerbaijan with the Medi-
terranean Sea basin was a project of key impor-
4 In 2006 an agreement on the transit of Kazakh oil via the 
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline was signed. According to orig-
inal plans, c. 35 million tons of Kazakh oil was supposed 
to be transported via this pipeline. In practice, however, 
the Kazakh transport was minor (c. 3 million tons a year), 
which was a result of the policy pursued by both Azerbai-
jan (high tariffs, unwillingness to give access to competitors) 
and Kazakhstan (an overly assertive approach towards for-
eign investors who were discouraged from constructing the 
Caspian Oil Transport System). Since the decision was made 
to expand the CPC route, and in the context of the current 
problems with the Kazakh Kashagan deposit, there are no 
prospects for increasing the export of Kazakh oil via the BTC 
pipeline at least in medium-term prospect. 
5 In 2013 unprecedented, two-day riots motivated by so-
cio-political factors took place in the town of İsmayıllı, di-
rectly caused by the authorities’ arrogant attitude. In 2013 
several similar demonstrations were also organised in Baku. 
The authorities’ response was to detain some of the activists, 
but also to launch limited reforms, e.g. in the army. 
The cooperation with Baku has enabled 
the West to gain access to fuels and 
strengthen the statehood of Azerbaijan, 
at the same time weakening Russia’s in-
fluences in the Caucasus.
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tance, strengthened further by the opening of 
the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline) which 
Baku used to finance the ‘arms race’ in the Cau-
casus: in the meantime Armenia also began to 
develop its military potential using support from 
Russia. Military spending was important because 
the government used the possible threat of war 
to consolidate society. Financial assets have also 
translated into an improvement of Azerbaijan’s 
position in the region, as demonstrated for ex-
ample by its successful economic expansion in 
Georgia and Turkey6. This has increased the polit-
ical importance of Azerbaijan in these countries7. 
Baku has also developed its cooperation with Is-
rael (arms purchases), based on both countries’ 
hostile attitude towards Iran.
The rising position of Azerbaijan on the interna-
tional stage began to be demonstrated in the 
country’s increasingly assertive policy towards 
the West and its direct rejection of the West’s 
criticism of the Azerbaijani government8. Azer-
baijan’s conviction of its right to its own vision 
of the country’s development, and its tendency 
to limit the foreign policy agenda to issues con-
nected with the economy and Karabakh9, have 
become particularly strong. A symbolic illustra-
6 Azerbaijan is one of the main investors in these two coun-
tries; it is also a major gas supplier (90% of Georgia’s de-
mand). In Georgia SOCAR owns regional gas distribution 
companies, an oil terminal in Kulevi and a chain of petrol 
stations; it provides over half of oil products. In Turkey SO-
CAR owns the petrochemical company Petkim (61.3% of 
the shares) and several gas distribution companies, and is 
involved in the construction of the Star refinery (as a sole 
shareholder). In both countries Azerbaijan is the co-owner 
of key transmission infrastructure: the BTC oil pipeline and 
the Heydar Aliyev oil terminal in Ceyhan, the Baku–Supsa oil 
pipeline, and the BTE gas pipeline. Moreover, Azerbaijan has 
granted Georgia an extremely favourable loan to construct 
the Georgian section of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway con-
necting the three countries and deepening the infrastructur-
al isolation of Armenia. 
7 This is illustrated by Azerbaijan forcing Turkey to break 
off talks on normalising relations with Armenia in 2009 
by threatening to withdraw deposits from Turkish banks. 
8 This became apparent for the first time in the context 
of Baku’s extremely sharp reaction to the OSCE’s rath-
er neutral preliminary assessment of the results of the 
2010 parliamentary elections. 
9 This concerned the major actors present in the region. 
At the same time Azerbaijan began to deepen its coop-
eration with Asian countries, which was most probably 
connected with the expansion of the Azeri SOCAR oil 
company onto new markets. 
tion of this tendency was Azerbaijan’s decision 
in 2011 to join the Non-Aligned Movement, an 
initiative with no real political significance.
These processes have resulted in a deep trans-
formation of the nature of the relations between 
Azerbaijan and the West; the country has moved 
from the position of an applicant hoping to 
start cooperation to that of a legitimate actor. 
This change is well illustrated by the evolution 
of the Southern Gas Corridor concept promot-
ed by the EU; when Azerbaijan became the only 
supplier of gas to the corridor, it rejected the gas 
transport projects which the EU had been pro-
moting and lobbying for over many years (Nab-
ucco) to replace them with its own project (the 
Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline TANAP). As a result, 
it was Azerbaijan, not the West, which became 
the main architect, executor and the largest 
shareholder of the planned infrastructure10. This 
means that if TANAP is created (in its current-
ly planned form), Baku and Ankara would gain 
control of the transit not only of its own gas but 
also gas from Central Asia, Iran and Iraq via the 
territory of Turkey (as long as no other additional 
infrastructure is created, which however would 
not have any economic sense for now). Such 
a major role for Azerbaijan in the implemen-
tation of the EU’s strategic concept makes the 
country ever more important for Moscow, which 
has been attempting to torpedo the Southern 
Gas Corridor initiative for years11. 
10 Azerbaijan holds 58% of shares in TANAP.
11 This is confirmed by the fact that Russia is promoting 
a competing project (South Stream) and has expressed its 
interest in purchasing the entire volume of gas extracted 
from the Shah-Deniz II deposit, which is the resource base 
for the Southern Corridor. 
The nature of the relations between Azerbai-
jan and the West has been radically changed 
– the country has moved from the position 
of an applicant hoping to start cooperation 
to the position of a legitimate actor.
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In the political dimension, despite the inclu-
sion of Azerbaijan in the Eastern Partnership 
programme, Baku’s cooperation with the West 
has been limited to energy and economic is-
sues and Baku’s attempts to win support in the 
talks over the Karabakh question12. Azerbaijan 
has treated the West as a recipient of natural 
resources, and is not interested in political co-
operation unless it is favourable to its own in-
terests (support in the Karabakh issue).
The Russian shadow over Azerbaijan
The results of Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the 
West have included a decrease in Russia’s im-
portance in Baku’s policy, and the achievement 
of the country’s economic independence from 
Moscow. Baku has attempted to limit its rela-
tions with Russia mainly because f its permanent 
doubts as to Moscow’s intentions, as well as the 
support Russia has granted to Armenia (for ex-
ample, the Russian troops stationed at the mil-
itary base in Gyumri, Armenia; the air defence 
system; and the cooperation within the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organisation, including 
weapons supplies). The dialogue between Baku 
and Moscow has continued mainly due to Rus-
sia’s role as a mediator in the Karabakh conflict13. 
Moscow has also been a beneficiary of contracts 
for the sale of weapons for Azerbaijan, which is 
determined to develop its military potential.
12 This approach has been illustrated by Azerbaijan’s lack 
of interest (declared in September 2013) in signing an 
Association Agreement with the EU because it contained 
certain political aspects, as well as Baku’s intention to 
join the Strategic Modernisation Partnership, which is 
focused on state modernisation projects and does not 
require any democratisation initiatives. 
13 Baku has been increasingly open in its questioning of 
Moscow’s impartiality in these talks. 
In this context, any activity by Russia to re-
vive the relations between the two states or 
strengthen its position in the region has been 
perceived by Baku as dangerous. This is how 
several events have been perceived, including 
the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the 
strengthening of the Russian presence in Arme-
nia (through the CSTO) and the integration pro-
cesses (the Eurasian Union) which Moscow has 
promoted, forcing Armenia to join in. Pressure 
has been put on Azerbaijan directly, for exam-
ple by the participation of Rustam Ibragimbe-
kov in the presidential election in October 2013. 
Ibragimbekov, a Russian citizen, was the main 
opposition candidate for president (however, 
he eventually withdrew from the presidential 
race). In Moscow the Azeri Billionaires’ Union 
was created, remaining beyond Baku’s control. 
Another disturbing event was President Vladi-
mir Putin’s visit to Baku shortly before the pres-
idential election, during which a wide-ranging 
cooperation proposal (including in the energy 
sector) was presented. It seems that Baku’s 
positive reaction to this proposal convinced 
Russia to withdraw its support for the opposi-
tion candidate. Finally, an important sign of the 
pressure exerted by Russia is the repeated sug-
gestions and invitations extended to Azerbai-
jan to join the Eurasian Union (for example, in 
June 2014), despite Baku’s consistent rejection 
of such a possibility and its declared unwilling-
ness to deepen its relations with the European 
Union (Baku has no plans to join). This policy is 
intended to symbolise Azerbaijan’s neutrality in 
relations between Russia and the West. From 
Baku’s perspective, Russian activity connected 
with the Eurasian Union has strikingly resem-
bled Moscow’s attempts to include Ukraine in 
this organisation in 2013. Russia has maintained 
its interest in developing economic coopera-
tion, and is counting on Azeri investments, as 
it hopes to replace Turkey as their recipient14. 
14 In 2014 AzPromo (Azerbaijan’s Promotion Agency) or-
ganised six economic forums with Russia, whereas in 
2013 there was only one such forum (based on informa-
tion from the website www.azpromo.az).
Any activity undertaken by Russia to re-
vive the relations between the two states 
or strengthen its position in the region has 
been perceived by Baku as dangerous.
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The Ukrainian context 
Russia’s activity has gained another dimension 
in connection with the events in Ukraine, inten-
sifying Azerbaijan’s fears. From Baku’s point 
of view, the developments in Ukraine have 
demonstrated the costs of taking too liberal 
an approach towards society (the toppling of 
Yanukovych), Moscow’s determination to pur-
sue its own interests, and Russia’s impunity in 
the post-Soviet area. This is all the more import-
ant as Baku has become aware that, contrary to 
Moscow’s hopes and offers, there has been no 
real intensification of cooperation in the strate-
gic areas (mainly in the energy sector15). Russia 
may be disappointed by Azerbaijan’s unwilling-
ness to join the Eurasian Union. It seems that 
Baku is particularly afraid of Russia’s interference 
in its home affairs, for example by exploiting 
the pro-Western non-governmental and oppo-
sition circles16 or fuelling tensions within society 
(e.g. using the ethnic minorities such as the 
Lezgins, who live in the northern part of Azer-
baijan near the Russian border; the Russian 
minority in Azerbaijan is very small). Bearing 
in mind the riots and demonstrations which 
took place before the 2013 presidential elec-
tion, Baku is also particularly sensitive to any 
potential social tensions. The fears among the 
ruling elite are inspired by the example of Geor-
gia, where (among other factors) under West-
ern pressure the camp centred around Mikheil 
Saakashvili lost power as a result of democratic 
elections, which from Baku’s perspective was 
a demonstration of the lack of the West’s loy-
alty towards its allies. Surprisingly, domestic 
15 Baku suspended the delivery of gas to Russia for five 
months, and the transport of Azeri oil via the Baku-Nov-
orosiysk route decreased by nearly 60% y/y in the period 
between January and August; the plans for the transit of 
Russian fuels through Azeri infrastructure have not been 
put into practice either. On the other hand, the volume 
of trade exchange has increased in Russia’s favour. 
16 From Baku’s perspective, Moscow’s support of the joint 
opposition candidate for president was the first example 
in many years of Russian interference in the domestic 
political affairs of Azerbaijan. 
turbulences in Azerbaijan, which could be initi-
ated by Moscow and referred to as democratic 
movements, could gain support from the West. 
The government’s almost paranoid approach 
to the issue of internal stability has been com-
bined with the increasing potential of the au-
thoritarian system. 
The Ukrainian crisis has also changed the situa-
tion around the disputed area of Nagorno-Kara-
bakh. It has modified the regional balance of 
power between Russia and the West, which so 
far has been one of the basic conditions and 
guarantees for the freezing of this conflict. 
The talks on resolving the Karabakh issue held 
within the OSCE Minsk Group have been pre-
sided over by the countries involved in the con-
flict over Ukraine: Russia, the USA and France. 
This has reduced the permanently weak chanc-
es for reaching a compromise to almost nil. 
A change has also been observed in both Ba-
ku’s and Yerevan’s perception of Karabakh as 
an instrument of Moscow’s policy. This became 
particularly apparent when Russia demonstrat-
ed its readiness and ability to pursue its goals 
in Ukraine using military methods, ignoring the 
costs of such actions and the position of the 
West. Baku fears that a new, Russian-inspired 
phase of the conflict over Karabakh could be 
a realistic instrument for exerting pressure on 
Azerbaijan.
The changing balance of power and the distrust 
of Russian policy on the part of Baku and Yere-
van (which is subject to Moscow and complete-
ly dominated by the Kremlin), have made the 
parties to the conflict revise their calculations 
concerning Karabakh. The tension has been 
further increased by the rumours spread by 
Russia can be disappointed by Azerbai-
jan’s unwillingness to join the Eurasian 
Union. 
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Armenian media that Russia might hand over 
a part of Karabakh to Azerbaijan in exchange 
for Baku’s joining the Eurasian Union (which 
perfectly illustrates the Armenians’ distrust of 
Russia). These factors have strengthened the 
fears and the nervous attitudes of both sides, 
resulting in an escalation of the conflict along 
the ceasefire line which was unprecedented 
in the recent decade; at least 22 soldiers were 
killed in acts of sabotage staged between 
30 July and 6 August. 
Azerbaijan’s response to these threats has been 
to consolidate the authoritarian regime by way 
of an unusually sharp campaign of repression 
focused on all independent circles (the opposi-
tion, ethnic minorities, Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, and international organisations), and 
targeted mainly at prominent and well-known 
human rights activists17 and the non-govern-
mental sector. Such a harsh campaign aimed 
at independent groups shows Baku’s disrespect 
for the West and Western values18. On the oth-
er hand, the West’s inability to influence Baku’s 
actions demonstrates the inefficiency of its pol-
icy; the repression was stepped up when Azer-
baijan assumed the presidency of the Council 
of Europe. 
17 The list of political prisoners in Azerbaijan, compiled by 
Leyla Yunus and Rasul Jafarov, contains 98 names. The 
authors of the report (published in August 2014) are cur-
rently in prison. 
18 In his address to the heads of Azerbaijani posts abroad, 
President Ilham Aliyev has stated that no foreign leader 
had ever put pressure on him in matters of democracy. 
A problem for Europe
By distancing itself from the European values 
and principles, Azerbaijan has moved even 
further away from Europe in the civilisational 
sense. By eliminating all signs of opposition 
against the system, the state has deprived it-
self of important channels of communication 
with society, as well as certain ‘safety valves’. 
This makes potential crises and social tensions 
all the more unpredictable and dangerous. At 
the same time, the Baku government’s grow-
ing authoritarian tendencies and the stepping 
up of repression are bringing Azerbaijan closer 
to Russia in the political sense, which is likely 
to complicate cooperation between the West 
and the regime in Baku. On the other hand, 
the growing pressure exerted by Russia and 
the lack of confidence in the effectiveness of 
the actions carried out by the West (which is 
evident in the current Ukrainian crisis), along 
with certain suspicions as to the intentions of 
both sides, will convince Baku to continue its 
isolation from the outside world and pursue 
a foreign policy which would be limited to se-
lected sectors only. Azerbaijan is likely to be-
come more interested in developing solely tech-
nical cooperation with the West. This would 
lead to converting the state model into an ‘oil 
company’ owned by a ruling elite for whom so-
ciety is a burden, not an asset.
Another challenge to the West would be Azer-
baijan’s increased vulnerability to Russian pres-
sure, which is likely to result in further com-
plications in relations between Baku and the 
West. In the maximal version the Kremlin’s 
goals are to include Azerbaijan in Russia’s in-
tegration projects and to impede the imple-
mentation of the Southern Gas Corridor project 
supported by the West. In the minimal version, 
Russia would most probably attempt to dis-
turb any rapprochement between Azerbaijan 
and the West, and to gain influence over the 
Another challenge to the West would be 
Azerbaijan’s increased vulnerability to the 
Russian pressure, which is likely to result 
in further complications in the relations 
between Baku and the West.
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Southern Corridor, for example by participat-
ing in it. This means that a measurable, nega-
tive consequence of Russian pressure could be 
the increased level of complications connected 
with implementing the Southern Gas Corridor 
project promoted by the West. 
Finally, the growing risk of a renewal of the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia could be another problem for the 
West. The freezing of the conflict seemed to be 
favourable for Western investments in Azerbai-
jan and for the implementation of energy proj-
ects (about which Baku has repeatedly remind-
ed the Western representatives in the Minsk 
Group, accusing them of in fact being interest-
ed in keeping the conflict frozen). A renewal of 
the war over Karabakh could at least impede 
the current cooperation in the energy area, and 
in this way guarantee Russia’s geopolitical vic-
tory over the West in the South Caucasus. 
